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Abstract
Nairobi’s paratransit vehicles—called matatus—provide most of the City’s public
transport. They are operated as private for-profit businesses with varying levels
of investment, labor, and strategic thinking. The vehicles are subject to regulation
but have little regard for laws, regulations, or the comfort of the traveling public.
Interviews of informed observers—the “bird’s-eye view”—underscored the business
character of matatu firms and revealed considerable variation in business structure,
modes of operation, levels of organization, and attitudes towards regulation, and
they highlighted ways that government and industry institutions affect matatu
organization and operations. This study identified eight elements of matatu business
strategy and a continuum of business organization; it also noted an emerging trend
towards higher levels of organization through franchising, networking, and owner
ship of multiple vehicles. The paper suggests that further development of varied
organizational forms could hold the key to a more user-friendly public transport
system for Nairobi.
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Introduction
Paratransit is the main form of public transport in many African cities. The vehicles
go by various names, such as “matatus” in Nairobi, “dala dala” in Dar es Salaam,
and “minibus taxis” in Cape Town. In developed countries, paratransit is, as its
name suggests, a mode of transport that operates parallel to an organized, usually
large-scale government-run or government-subsidized transport system. In many
African countries, for a variety of reasons, the parallel system has become the
main public transport system available. It is, therefore, crucial to understand how
it operates.
The matatu mode of transport provides most of Nairobi’s public transport services
(Aligula et al. 2005). The matatus are owned by individuals and private companies,
and so form part of Nairobi’s private sector. An important characteristic of Nai
robi’s paratransit is its almost total lack of adherence to traffic rules, prescribed
routes, and regulatory requirements. The resulting chaotic behavior has long been
referred to as “matatu madness” (see East African Standard 1998; Daily Nation
1999). Yet, despite this apparent similarity in behavior, matatu businesses differ
from each other in important ways. Some of these differences are readily observ
able. Equipment ranges from shabby vans and buses that have long been battered
by encounters with other vehicles to brightly-painted minibuses equipped with
hostesses and built-in DVD players. Many have music systems, but the volume and
the type of music played vary from one to another. Youth form the bulk of the
passengers for some, while others carry mainly older commuters and shoppers. Dif
ferences in the propensity to break speed limits, vary fares, deviate from approved
routes, harass passengers, and/or obstruct traffic are also easy to see.
Less observable are differences in owner characteristics, age and history of the busi
ness, forms of internal organization, linkages with other actors, amount and type of
financing, type of vehicle ownership, route assignment, and number and types of
external linkages that businesses form with other actors within and outside their
own sector of operation. Theories of institutions and firm strategic behavior sug
gest that these and other differences may not simply be “matatu madness” but are,
in fact, part of the market and business development strategies of matatu firms.
The project’s overall research question is, therefore: To what extent do firms with
different strategies respond differently to actual or proposed regulations, and what
are the implications of these differences for the government’s ability to implement
change? The questions driving this paper were, however, somewhat more limited
because the paper seeks to provide a basic understanding of the main elements
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of paratransit business strategies in Nairobi. The research covers public transport
operating in Nairobi City. Matatus are its subjects, and its sources of data are
informed observers of the matatu sector. The paper aims to provide a basic under
standing of the institutional context and the main elements of paratransit business
strategies in Nairobi as preparation for a more detailed firm-level study.
Research for this paper took the form of a scoping study that aimed at identifying
the main features of strategy development and implementation among Nairobi’s
paratransit operators as seen by knowledgeable observers. It took, in other words,
a “bird’s-eye view” of the matatu industry. Primary data were gathered through indepth interviews of 18 purposively-selected key informants and feedback during a
stakeholders workshop. Data analysis was qualitative and thematic.
The paper is organized into six parts. The following section reviews relevant litera
ture. Part 3 puts the study into a theoretical context and briefly examines empirical
findings on urban transport strategies. Part 4 outlines the research methodology.
Part 5 presents the findings, and Part 6 summarizes and draws conclusions from
the findings.

Urban Paratransit
Paratransit vehicles are part of Kenya’s urban public transport system. Public trans
portation is a service provided by public or private entities and is available to all
persons who pay the prescribed fare (Vuchic n.d.). Urban public transport has been
defined as a system that provides for the movement of people and goods within
an urban area and also links the city to its environs (Aligula et al 2005). Paratransit
operators in the global North and South spring up to fulfill unsatisfied demand for
public transport as result of urban growth. However, whereas in the global North
they form a tiny minority (Cervero 1997; Lee 1990; Őrn 2005), in the global South,
in most cases, the share of demand served by such paratransit operators is often
50 percent and sometimes accounts for all public transport services in the urban
areas (Cervero 2000; Boudreaux 2006; Chitere and Kibua 2004). Paratransit vehicles
vary from human-powered pedicabs to mid-sized motorised buses (Cervero 2000;
Illes 2005).
Most paratransit operations in developing countries are supplied by the private
sector rather than the public sector (Sclar et al. 2007). Many observers attribute
the shift to private-sector transport to inefficiencies in the major public transport
companies (Khayesi 2002; Cervero and Golub 2007; Sclar et al. 2007; Schalekamp et
al., 2008). Some point out that in much of Africa and in smaller Asian cities where
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municipal budgets are stretched thin and technical capacities for planning, admin
istration, and regulation are insufficient, almost by default, informal transport
offers the only dependable services available (Cervero and Golub 2007). An earlier
study by Golub (2005) also confirmed that, in many cities, regular public transpor
tation systems do not meet all of the demands of the marketplace, and small-scale
operators, legally or illegally, enter the market to fill these gaps. Such small opera
tors typically have little transportation business expertise (Chitere 2006; Finn et
al. 2011). Mũnoz and Gschwender (2008) argue that atomized ownership leads to
increased traffic rule violations and a deterioration of services.
Where large numbers of private-sector operators provide public transport, regu
lating and controlling such individually-owned small vehicles is a serious challenge
(Sohail et al. 2004). This is especially so because the vehicles represent a multiplicity
of small businesses, each of which is trying to make a profit. This has led authorities
in some African cities to focus on the question of whether an effort should be made
to “formalize” or regulate paratransit operations and to try to identify the obstacles
to such formalization (Kumar and Barrett 2008 (Wilkinson 2008; Wilkinson et al.
2011). A range of options for managing competition have been advanced, including
public monopolies, management contracting, public-private partnerships, conces
sioning, and quality licensing (Sohail et al. 2004; Wilkinson 2008; Kumar and Barrett
2008; Chitere 2009). Choosing among these options requires a good understanding
of the variety and, especially, the private-sector nature of paratransit operators.
Research in various countries has shown that urban bus services respond to chang
ing contexts in many different ways. In other words, there is no unique solution to
the problems facing paratransit in developing countries (Finn and Mulley 2011).

Business Strategies of Urban Transport Firms
Business Strategies
Understanding a business strategy requires a clear notion of what a business is.
This is particularly important in the case of urban public transport, because the
experience of industrialized countries is that transport operators are usually public,
rather than private, entities. A business is simply a private firm that aims to make
a profit.1 There is no universal definition of business strategy (Kelly and Kouzmin
2009). We adopt a basic definition that can fit large and small firms: A strategy
is a plan of action that is intended to move a firm toward the achievement of its
shorter-term goals and, ultimately, toward the achievement of its fundamental
purposes (Harrison and St. John 2008).
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Strategy aims to achieve advantages for the organization by using available
resources to meet the needs of the market and fulfill stakeholder expectations
( Johnson and Scholes 2004). Business-level strategy def ines an organization’s
approach to growth and competition in its chosen business segments (Harrison
and St. John 2010). A firm’s resources and capabilities determine its competitive
advantage, which, in turn, gives rise to strategies for realizing that advantage (Grant
1991). The strategies describe how businesses compete in areas they have selected.
The strategies may vary widely from business to business because they are shaped
by competitive forces as well as the resources possessed by each of the units of the
firm. If an organization is involved in only one area of business, then all of its busi
ness strategy decisions tend to be made by the same people. Such strategies are
implemented through day-to-day decisions made at the operating level of a firm
(Hrebiniak and Joyce 1984).
Business strategies are also shaped by forces external to the firm. The international
literature on national business systems has shown how business organization and
behavior varies from one country to another (Whitley 1992, 2008). Part of this
variation can be observed in the type of strategies adopted by businesses in differ
ent places. Most of the work on business systems has emanated from industrial
ized countries and emerging economies in Asia and Eastern Europe, but there is
a small, but growing literature on African business systems that points to similar
differentiation in African economies (Pedersen and McCormick 1999, McCormick
and Kimuyu 2007).
The collective day-to-day decisions made and actions taken by employees respon
sible for value activities create functional strategies. Functional strategy contains
the details of how the functional areas such as marketing, operations, finance,
and research & development should work together to achieve the business level
strategy (Harrison and St. John 2010). The competitive advantage and distinc
tive competences that are sought by the firms are often embedded in the skills,
resources, and capabilities at the functional level. Functional strategies are the
plans for matching those skills, resources, and capabilities with functional goals
and activities.
Strategy as a Framework for Analysis
Functional strategies touch on the details of what will be done in each area of the
business. In large businesses, such functional strategies are developed and imple
mented in functional departments. In smaller firms, the entrepreneur will be the
main architect of strategy. In such small firms, neither the overall nor the functional
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strategies are necessarily written down. Whether written or not, the elements of
a strategy can be identified and used as a framework for understanding the varia
tions among firms.

Methodology
Research for this paper took the form of a scoping study that aimed at identifying
the main features of strategy development and implementation among Nairobi’s
paratransit operators as seen by knowledgeable observers. It took, in other words,
a “bird’s-eye view” of the matatu industry. The scoping study was the first phase
of a larger study of paratransit business strategies and regulatory compliance.
The research team gathered primary data through 18 interviews of purposivelyselected key informants and feedback during a stakeholder workshop. Interview
ees, who were chosen based on their institutional affiliation, were drawn from the
Kenya Government (7), the private sector (9), and donor agencies (2) (see Table 1).
Table 1. Key Informants in Public Sector, Private Sector, and Donor Agencies
Public Sector (KG)

Private Sector (KP)

• Ministry of Transport
• Ministry of Roads and Public
Works
• Ministry of Nairobi
Metropolitan Development
• Kenyan Urban Roads
Authority (KURA)
• Kenya Bureau of Standards
• Transport Licensing Board (TLB)
• Nairobi City Council

• World Bank
• Citi Hoppa Ltd.
• Japan
• Double M Services Express
International
Connections Ltd.
Cooperation
• Smart Bus Company
Agency (JICA)
• MOA Compliant
• Star Bus Company
• KBS Management Ltd.
• Africa Merchant Assurance Co. Ltd.
• Equity Bank Kenya
• Family Bank

Donor Agencies (KD)

Primary data collection used face-to-face interviews and observation. Interviewing
of key informants ran from April to July 2010. Using pre-prepared interview guides,
researchers asked all key informants to give their impressions of the basic operat
ing strategies of the matatu business and to identify ways in which these strate
gies differ from one operator to another. Respondents were also asked additional
questions, which were tailored to each informant’s area of operation or expertise.
A stakeholder’s workshop was held in the month of July 2010 to discuss the ini
tial findings of the scoping study and collect additional information. Researcher
observations on matters such as driving behavior, the crowding of vehicles, and the
nature of matatu driver and conductor interactions with passengers, other motor
ists, pedestrians, and police officers supplemented the interview material.
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Sources of secondary data included published literature, Web-based materials,
government documents, and maps. The literature review covered books on urban
transport, journal articles, newspaper articles, websites, reports, Government of
Kenya documents, working papers, and discussion papers. Data analysis was quali
tative and thematic. Themes were derived from the literature and the interview
guides.
Matatu Industry Organization and Business Strategies
The research findings fall into two main categories: the general organization of the
industry and/or industry segments and the business strategies of matatu firms.
Strategy and Industry Organization
To understand the general organization of the matatu industry in Nairobi, it is
helpful first to look at organization as a concept and at its manifestations at the
firm level. An organization in its simplest form is a person or group of people inten
tionally organized to accomplish an overall, common goal or set of goals. Business
organizations can range in size from one person to tens of thousands and can be
structured as one-person enterprises, partnerships, or multi-layered corporations
(Nicolescu, 2009; Ricketts, 1994). The term “organization” is used in its basic dic
tionary sense of having an orderly structure or being systematized (Concise Oxford
Dictionary 1990). The type and complexity of firm organization is sometimes taken
for granted or considered as a simple function of business size, but size itself can
be the outcome of decisions concerning the scope of the firm (Ricketts 1994). In
other words, the type and level of organization are clearly related to the conscious
decisions and strategies of the firm, and different strategies may be pointers to dif
ferent levels of organization.
Analysis of the responses to questions about the strategies of matatu business
yielded an overall picture of an industry made up of firms that vary considerably in
their levels of organization. Using the main strategy types and the rough yardstick
of “low,” “moderate,” and “high” levels of organization highlights some of the key
differences found among firms in the sector (see Table 2).
The early research revealed three important points along what is expected to be a
continuum of organization (see Figure 1). Based on our key informant interviews,
we identified three main groupings. At the low end of the business organization
scale was the typical matatu; next came the first group in the moderate organiza
tion range, the management companies. Finally, more organized but still in the
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moderate range, were Nairobi’s larger transport business with multiple vehicles. No
Nairobi operators were considered to be highly organized.
Table 2. Strategy and Organization of Matatu Businesses
Strategy

Low Organization

Moderate Organization High Organization

Business
ownership,
structure
and levels of
investment

• Individual, owning one • Group ownership
or more vehicles
(family, partnerships,
cooperatives, limited
companies)

• Limited companies

Financing

• Self, family, and
friends

• Self, family and banks

• Investors and banks

Routes and
vehicle types

• Operate in one route
allocated by TLB/
control of routes by
gangs
• Considerable
deviation from routes
• Mainly 14-seaters

• Operate in one or
more than one routes;
routes controlled
by cooperatives
or management
companies; some
deviation from routes
• Mainly 25–55 seater
minibuses

• Routes controlled
by legally mandated
transport
authorities;
complete adherence
to assigned routes.
• Mini and full-size
buses

Pricing

• Flat zoned, variation
with traffic and
weather

• Flat zoned, monthly
coupons and smart
cards

• Seasonal tickets
which are
transferable, no
deviations allowed

Operations
– repair and
maintenance,
recruitment

• Individually
undertaken by each
operator

• Done by management
companies

• Centralized

Regulatory
compliance

• Low or non-existent
compliance

• Complies with some,
but not all, regulations

• Full compliance

Promotion and
advertising

• Individual promotion
through touting at
stages

• Some advertising on
vehicles

• Centralised
advertising strategy

Customer
relations

• Not emphasized

• Guidelines given

• Emphasized

Business
linkages and
networking

• Mainly personal ties
and linkages through
informal groups

• Mix of formal and
informal linkages

• Predominance of
formal linkages

Source: Authors’ conceptualization from field data.
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Source: Authors’ conceptualization

Figure 1. Continuum of Public Transport Business Organization
Firm-level Organization
The notion of a continuum of organization in the matatu industry that emerged
in the previous discussion provides a backdrop for a more detailed understanding
of the organization and behavior of individual firms in each of the three categories.
Low Business Organization: The Typical Matatu
The “typical” matatu is a 14-seater van owned by an individual who is involved in
the transport business as a sole owner/driver or as side venture to employment
or other types of business. The vans are bought second-hand in Kenya or directly
from Japan and represent an investment of just over Kshs 1 million ($12,820 US).2
In the “typical” category also— mainly because they are very common on some
routes—are the larger mini-buses that are usually bought new from Kenyan assem
blers, mainly General Motors Kenya. The latest of these to enter the market has 37
seats and carries a price tag of Kshs 3.8 million ($48,718 US) (Daily Nation, 16 June
2010). Our observations suggest that older large buses are being recycled into use
as matatus on some routes, while, in some cases, the mini-buses are converted Lor
ries. Installing an entertainment system can considerably increase the investment
in any type of matatu.
The fare strategy is designed to maximize profits and minimize the owner’s direct
involvement in the management of the vehicle. The common use of a “target sys
tem,” however, means that the vehicle owner receives a fixed daily amount while
increases or decreases in revenues mostly affect the amount retained by the crew
(KG).3 The crew is responsible to pay for fuel and other daily expenses except repairs
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and maintenance from the daily collections. The target system allows the crew
to keep anything above the agreed amount, thus increasing their incentive to do
whatever is necessary to maximize their revenues (KG). The fare itself is usually a
flat-zoned fare, which is increased in peak periods and doubled or more when it
rains or the vehicle is caught in heavy traffic jams. The owner’s profit goal, however,
is not always realized because the crew sometimes fails to meet the target.
Key informants emphasized that the typical matatu is poorly managed. Its daily
operations are in the hands of the crew with little or no supervision from the
owner. Owners lack management skills and the crew lacks basic training. There is
little banking or record keeping (KG). Vehicles shun timetables in order to travel
with a full load. Cutthroat competition results in vehicles over-speeding, picking
and dropping passengers anywhere along the route, and deviating from prescribed
routes to avoid obstacles or traffic jams (KG, KP, SW). Owners condone over-speed
ing, in some cases authorizing the removal of speed governors (KG). Profit rather
than service is the main concern (KG). The typical matatu hires unqualified crew,
over which the owner has little control. Respondents say that most are dropouts
from secondary school (KG, SW).
Many vehicles are uninsured (KG). Those with insurance mostly have only thirdparty cover (KP).4 This leaves owners vulnerable to damage caused by accidents
and, in some cases, penalties for failing to comply with regulations requiring at least
third-party cover. The typical matatu's frequent accidents are blamed on the care
lessness of the drivers (KG). Vehicles are constantly on the road, because owners
are reluctant to rest them. One industry player observed that it is not possible to
employ crew on contracts providing for time off because when a vehicle is off the
road there is no income to pay the crew (SW). Maintenance costs for the vehicles
are high, and a vehicle’s useful life is fairly short.
Crew members display unruly behaviour and a “don’t-care” attitude towards both
passengers and the vehicle itself (KG, KP). Customer relations are poor. Drivers
and conductors rarely see passengers as “customers.” Although conductors show
and/or call out the number and destination to attract passengers into the matatu,
once passengers board the vehicle they may be harassed or treated badly. Some
14-seaters have music systems, but the choice of music and control of its volume
is at the discretion of the crew. Passengers’ occasional complaints are usually disre
garded. Many mini-buses have more elaborate entertainment systems in an effort
to attract the youth market on some routes.
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The typical matatu operates on its own, with little interaction between its owner
and the owners of similar vehicles. Only a small proportion of owners belong to an
association, and 14-seater matatus are not included in existing franchise arrange
ments. This is changing as a result of the Transport Licensing Board’s 2010 directive
requiring public service vehicle (PSV) owners to join organized groups such as
savings and credit co-operatives (SACCO) or companies in order to be registered
(Daily Nation, 23 December 2010). Since the beginning of 2011, stand-alone mata
tus are not eligible for registration.
Moderate Business Organization: Matatu Management Companies
Three companies presently operating in Nairobi as management companies fit into
the moderate business organization category. All three of these manage buses on
behalf of individual investors, providing a range of services.
The basic concept underlying the management companies is franchising. A
franchise can be loosely defined as an authorization to sell a company's goods
or services in a particular place. The person or entity who owns the business, its
trademark, and the system is the franchisor. The entity authorized to sell is the
franchisee. In this case, the management company (franchisor) generally holds a
trademark and a set of operating procedures, services, and/or standards that the
individual matatu owner (franchisee) buys the right to use.
Two of the franchise companies interviewed operate solely as managers of vehicles
for individual owners. The third has both franchised vehicles and owned vehicles.
The companies differ in their requirements for obtaining a franchise, the services
offered, funds management procedures, vehicle specifications, and operating rules.
In all cases, the public can easily recognize the franchised buses by their color and
design. One of the management companies originally required that its franchisees
have at least five vehicles, but found difficulty in enforcing this rule (KP). Other
industry stakeholders refer to them as examples of what a more organized trans
port system might look like.
Moderate Business Organizations: Bus Companies5
A bus company can usually exert more control over its operations than a manage
ment company. Bus companies represent a second form of moderate business
organization. Our research identified two companies with fleets of buses. A “fleet”
can be defined as group of buses operating together under the same ownership.
These are, therefore, companies that own and operate their own vehicles, includ
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ing hiring and training their own staff. Both are private companies offering public
transport services.
Defining a fleet as a group gives considerable latitude for variations in size. One
Nairobi bus company has only 15 vehicles but aspires to have 300 in the future;
another already has 200. The next stage of the research may yield data that will
enable us to estimate the size of fleet necessary for a viable company.
Formulating strategy in a unified company is basically the task of the owners, who
can put in place appropriate measures to implement their ideas. Our bus company
interviews focused on the respondent views of matatu operations and, therefore,
did not yield full information on the companies’ own strategies. Further interviews
to fill the gaps on company strategy will be conducted in the next phase.
Although the bus companies are better organized than most public transport
players in Nairobi, they cannot be considered to be highly organized for two rea
sons. First, most lack the ticketing and fleet management systems that would be
necessary for the highest degree of organization (SW). Second, although company
vehicles follow regulations to a greater extent than matatus in either the low or
moderate organization groups, researchers have observed enough violations to
support their judgment that these firms have not yet achieved the “full compli
ance” expected of highly-organized transport providers.

Summary and Conclusions
Summary
Interviews of informed observers – the “bird’s-eye view” – provided new informa
tion about matatu industry organization and its individual business enterprises.
The first and perhaps most important finding is that the industry shows consider
able variation in business structure, modes of operation, levels of organization, and
attitudes towards regulation. To highlight this finding, we proposed a continuum
of organization, with the “typical” individually-owned matatu at one end and the
multi-vehicle bus company near the other end. We noted that no Nairobi bus com
pany could be called “highly organized” by international standards.
The second finding has to do with the strategies of individual businesses. Eight
elements of a business strategy appear to apply to matatu businesses: 1) business
ownership and investment; 2) financing; 3) routes and vehicle types; 4) pricing; 5)
operations; 6) promotion and advertising; 7) customer relations; and 8) business
linkages and networking. The findings suggest that these elements are present in
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varying degrees and combinations. In theory, at least, each matatu business can
develop its own unique strategy by combining the elements in different ways. The
extent to which this actually happens and which strategies seem to work best in
the Nairobi environment require further research.
Conclusions
The study has yielded three main conclusions. First, this “bird’s-eye view” demon
strates that keen observers can identify various elements of business strategy in the
matatu sector. It is not possible, however, at this level to know all of the variations
and commonalities of these strategies, nor to understand the motivation behind
their adoption by particular firms. More importantly, it is not possible, without
detailed case studies, to understand the links between business strategy and firm
choices to comply or not comply with traffic and operational regulations.
Second, it is clear that Nairobi’s public transport system has grown, adapted, and
reorganized itself many times in the past few decades. It appears that this evo
lutionary process is continuing with the emergence of franchising, networking,
ownership of multiple vehicles, and, most recently, the promotion of transport
savings and credit cooperative organisations (SACCOs). It is possible that further
development of varied organizational forms could hold the key to a more userfriendly public transport system for Nairobi.
Finally, the findings have implications for the formation and application of poli
cies and regulations. In what appears to be a quite varied landscape of matatu
businesses, policymakers and regulators need to listen keenly to the full range of
matatu voices. This is difficult in the present, somewhat disorganized industry
structure. The directive calling for improved organization through SACCOs and
transport companies has the potential to improve communication channels, but it
also runs the risk of putting into place organizations that lack credibility across dif
ferent matatu types. Nevertheless, the development of varied organizational forms
is a hopeful sign that could hold the key to a more user-friendly public transport
system in Nairobi.

Endnotes
We take the classic definition of a firm as “the system of relationships which
comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent upon an entre
preneur” (Coase 1937).
1
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At the time of the research, the exchange rate was approximately Kshs 78 to the
US dollar.
2

K = data from key informant interviews; SW = data collected from the stake
holder’s workshop; G, P, D = interview data from government, private sector, and
donors.
3

Third-party cover is liability insurance purchased by an insured (the first party)
from an insurer (the second party) for protection against the claims of another
(the third) party. The first party is responsible for its own damages or losses
whether caused by itself or the third party. A matatu carrying third-party cover
will be insured against damages to other persons and their property in accidents it
causes. See http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/third-party-insurance.
html#ixzz2BbpfOh62.
4

For purposes of this research, a “bus company” is a company that 1) owns some
or all of the vehicles it operates and 2) has or aspires to have a large fleet of vehi
cles operating on multiple intra-city routes. The bus companies included in this
research generally operate mini- and/or full-size buses. The term is preferred to its
logical alternative—a matatu company—because it is recognized in the industry in
Nairobi as a specific group of operators.
5
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